



The Fate of Perception in a Post-Screen World: A Merleau-Pontian Inquiry

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Abstract:

This paper examines the evolution of human perception in a post-screen world, characterized by the growing prevalence of immersive, ambient, and wearable technologies that supplant conventional screen-based mediation. Utilizing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, the research reevaluates embodiment, spatiality, and sensorimotor intentionality in the context of augmented reality, artificial intelligence, and pervasive computing. While current research predominantly examines screen cultures and digital visuality, this paper introduces an innovative theoretical framework by suggesting a phenomenology of post-screen perception, wherein perceptual experience is no longer chiefly structured around framed visual interfaces but is instead disseminated through bodily movement, haptic feedback, and environmental responsiveness. The paper contends that post-screen technologies transform the lived body (*corps propre*) from a perceiving subject in front of a screen into a dynamically integrated node within hybrid physical-digital environments. By expanding upon Merleau-Ponty's notions of flesh, intercorporeality, and operative intentionality, the research formulates a novel framework for examining the transformation of perceptual habits, attentional structures, and bodily orientation in post-screen contexts. This Merleau-Pontian investigation introduces a novel phenomenological lexicon for comprehending emerging modalities of mediated perception and presents a critical philosophical counterpoint to technologically determinist interpretations of digital experience.

Keywords: Phenomenology of perception; embodied cognition; post-screen culture; digital embodiment; perceptual mediation; lived body; phenomenology of technology

1. Introduction: From Screen Culture to Post-Screen Perception

For many years, philosophical and media-theoretical analyses of digital experience have centered on the screen's preeminence as the principal medium of mediation. Screens have shaped the theoretical frameworks surrounding perception, attention, and embodiment in the context of digital technologies, frequently emphasizing visuality, framing, and representational interfaces. Recent technological advancements—including augmented and mixed reality, wearable computing, ambient interfaces, and artificial intelligence-driven environments—indicate a gradual transition towards a post-screen era, wherein digital mediation transcends traditional visual displays and becomes more integrated with bodily movement, spatial contexts, and multisensory interactions. This change puts established screen-centered models of perception to the test and calls for new philosophical thought. Current research has investigated immersive and embodied interaction within virtual and augmented environments; however, a significant portion of this work is anchored in cognitive, computational, or interaction-design paradigms, frequently regarding embodiment as a functional variable rather than a fundamental aspect of lived experience. Consequently, the profound phenomenological ramifications of post-screen mediation for perceptual organization, corporeal orientation, and subject-world relations are insufficiently theorized.

This paper seeks to fill this gap by revisiting the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose analysis of perception underscores the primacy of the lived body (*corps propre*), operative intentionality, and the

indissoluble connection between body and world. According to Merleau-Ponty (2002), "the world is nothing but 'world-as-meaning'" (p. xii). Merleau-Ponty's critique of empiricist and intellectualist models of perception positions perception not merely as a passive reception of stimuli or a purely mental construction, but as an embodied, pre-reflective engagement with a meaningful world. His subsequent ontology of flesh intensifies this perspective by framing perception as a chiasmic interrelation of observer and observed, body and environment, thereby providing a significant conceptual tool for the analysis of technologically mediated contexts. Recent phenomenological inquiries into artificial intelligence and immersive technologies have initiated a reexamination of Merleau-Ponty's pertinence to modern circumstances. These studies primarily concentrate on machine perception or human-AI comparison, rather than the extensive transformation of perceptual fields in contexts where mediation is ubiquitous, wearable, and spatially integrated. What has not been thoroughly examined is the way that post-screen technologies change how we perceive things, how we move our bodies, and even the structure of the perceptual field itself.

The primary assertion of this paper is that post-screen technologies not only present novel interfaces but also fundamentally restructure perceptual experience by transitioning mediation from framed visual surfaces to hybrid physical-digital environments. This paper puts forth a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of post-screen perception, contending that perception in these contexts is increasingly defined by distributed sensorimotor coupling, hybrid spatiality, and a reconfiguration of operative intentionality. This study expands upon Merleau-Ponty's notions of lived body, flesh, and intercorporeality, creating a novel theoretical framework for comprehending the evolution of perception beyond screen-centric mediation. This paper enhances current discussions in phenomenology, media philosophy, and technology studies by presenting a non-deterministic, embodied perspective on post-screen experience. Instead of looking at new technologies only in terms of how efficient, immersive, or powerful they are, this study looks at how they change the ways we understand meaning, our bodies, and our relationships with the world around us. The analysis seeks to furnish a philosophical lexicon adept at articulating the experiential metamorphoses inherent in a post-screen society.

2. Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception

"Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. xi). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology provides a fundamental critique of representational and intellectualist models of perception by contextualizing perceptual experience within the lived body (*corps propre*). In opposition to perspectives that characterize perception as either the passive reception of sensory information or the outcome of cognitive construction, Merleau-Ponty contends that perception constitutes an embodied, pre-reflective interaction with a significant reality. According to Merleau-Ponty (2002), "[T]he movements of one's own body are naturally invested with a certain perceptual signification" (p. 55). The body is not merely an object within a collection of objects; it is the fundamental condition through which a world is revealed. Merleau-Ponty (2012) argued that "the body is our general medium for having a world" (p. 169). The concept of embodied intentionality is fundamental to this narrative. Merleau-Ponty posits that intentionality is not predominantly a mental act aimed at representations, but rather is founded in the body's practical engagement with its environment. The body "knows" how to occupy space through posture, movement, and routine behavior. This motor intentionality demonstrates that perception is inherently sensorimotor, organized by bodily capabilities rather than by dispassionate observation. In this context, perception is inherently linked to action and cannot be merely confined to visual representation. According to Merleau-Ponty (2002), "the theory of the body schema is implicitly a theory of perception" (p. 239). Merleau-Ponty's focus on spatiality adds even more depth to this embodied account. Lived space is not a neutral container for objects; it is a field of meaningful orientations structured around corporeal potentials. Near and far, accessible and inaccessible, are not solely geometric distinctions but are delineated through corporeal interaction. This understanding of spatiality is especially pertinent for examining technologically mediated environments, in which spatial relationships are progressively blended by digital overlays, adaptive systems, and immersive interfaces. In discussing spatiality, Merleau-Ponty (2012) also notes that "we must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time." (p. 161).

In his later work, Merleau-Ponty elaborates on the ontology of flesh (*la chair*), which profoundly transforms the relational framework of perception. Flesh signifies the fundamental medium wherein body and world are interwoven, rendering the perceiver and the perceived inseparable. The well-known idea of reversibility, in which the hand that touches can also be touched, shows how perception has a chiasmic structure in which the subject and the object affect each other. This ontology contests dualistic interpretations of mediation and offers conceptual tools for considering technologically enhanced environments as extensions and transformations of this interconnection, rather than as external augmentations to an otherwise intact perceptual subject. Another important idea is operative intentionality, which is the bodily level of meaning that is established before conscious thought. Operative intentionality determines how the world appears as inherently meaningful, influencing perceptual habits and anticipations. This idea is very important for understanding how technological environments can change how we see things, not just on a conscious level but also on a more basic level of bodily attunement and habitual orientation. Recent phenomenological research has reaffirmed the significance of Merleau-Ponty's framework for modern technology and media studies. These interpretations underscore that phenomenology is especially adept at examining how technologies reconfigure lived experience rather than merely augmenting cognitive capacities. Nonetheless, a significant portion of this research continues to concentrate on screen-based or representational models of mediation, thereby leaving unresolved the inquiry into how Merleau-Ponty's theories could be systematically applied to post-screen, ambient, and hybrid contexts. This paper extends Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology by conceptualizing post-screen technologies as alterations of the perceptual field itself. Instead of viewing these technologies as neutral instruments or external interfaces, they are regarded as reconceptualizations of embodied intentionality, spatiality, and the interrelation of body and world. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology offers both a theoretical framework and the conceptual foundation for the formulation of a phenomenology of post-screen perception.

3. From Screen to Environment: Conceptualizing the Post-Screen World

The idea of a post-screen world doesn't mean that screens will go away; instead, it means that the way digital mediation is set up will change in a bigger way. Screens are becoming less and less important on their own. They are now just one part of a larger technological ecosystem that includes augmented and mixed reality, wearable devices, ambient displays, voice-based interfaces, sensor networks, and AI-driven environmental responsiveness. In these contexts, mediation is no longer predominantly focused on framed visual surfaces but is instead dispersed throughout spatial environments and bodily movement. Media theory has long focused on the cultural and perceptual effects of screen-based interfaces, especially when it comes to visual dominance, framing, and the relationship between the viewer and the screen. But new technologies are changing this model by making the line between interface and environment less clear. Instead of standing in front of a screen, users are spending more and more time in hybrid physical-digital spaces, where digital information is layered on top of or mixed with the real world. This change shows a shift from representational interfaces to environmental mediation, where perception is shaped by constant interaction with surroundings that respond.

So, the world after the screen has three connected features. First, mediation becomes spatialized: digital content is tied to places, things, and movements in real life, not just two-dimensional displays. Second, mediation becomes multisensory: haptic feedback, sounds, and body language can add to or even replace visual interaction. Third, mediation becomes ambient: technologies work in the background, changing how we see and act without always needing our full attention. These features collectively subvert the conventional paradigm of the user as a visually oriented entity situated in front of a screen. Previous studies on immersive and ambient technologies have frequently contextualized these advancements in relation to usability, efficiency, or presence. While these approaches yield significant empirical insights, they predominantly frame perception in functional or instrumental contexts, focusing on task execution and information processing. A philosophical examination of how these technological environments reconfigure the entire perceptual field is often lacking—specifically, how they alter the structure of perception, its orientation, and the emergence of meaning within lived experience.

From a Merleau-Pontian standpoint, this transformation is consequential as it modifies the corporeal conditions governing perception. When mediation shifts from screen-based to environmental contexts, the body transitions from focusing on a singular visual object to participating in an ongoing sensorimotor interaction with a hybrid environment. In this context, perception involves navigating, inhabiting, and responding to a technologically influenced world, rather than merely observing representations. Thinking about the world after screens in this way lets us move from interface-centered analysis to field-centered analysis. The emphasis shifts from examining user-device interactions to understanding how perceptual fields are formed through the integration of bodily movement, spatial arrangement, and technological responsiveness. This rethinking sets the stage for a phenomenological study of how the lived body changes under post-screen conditions, which is what the next section will be about.

4. Reconfiguring the Lived Body in Post-Screen Conditions

In screen-centered mediation models, the body is generally depicted as a relatively stable perceiving entity directed towards an external display. While bodily posture and ergonomics are factors, the primary perceptual relationship is organized around vision and frontal orientation. Post-screen technologies alter this configuration by converting the body from a passive observer of a screen into an actively integrated and responsive component within a hybrid perceptual environment. From a Merleau-Pontian standpoint, this transition necessitates a reconfiguration of the lived body (*corps propre*) as the central locus of perception. In post-screen contexts, corporeal movement, gestures, and proprioception emerge as principal modalities for engaging with digital mediation. The body is no longer just the place where perception comes from; it is also a way that technological environments are constantly changing. This change puts the sensorimotor basis of perception front and center and makes habitual bodily orientation even more important in how the world is revealed.

Haptic interfaces, motion tracking, and wearable devices further contribute to this reconfiguration by redistributing perceptual functions across the body. Touch, pressure, vibration, and kinesthetic feedback enhance visual perception, resulting in a more dispersed and multisensory perceptual organization. Instead of being limited to the eyes and hands that are aimed at a screen, perceptual engagement spreads throughout the whole body. This corroborates Merleau-Ponty's assertion that perception cannot be simplified to a singular sensory modality but is rooted in the body's comprehensive practical interaction with its surroundings. This redistribution of the body also changes the structure of agency. In post-screen settings, action and perception become more closely linked: gestures, movements, and body position directly affect the digital environment, which then changes what the body can do next. This reciprocal modulation illustrates Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, wherein the body not only reacts to stimuli but also actively generates meaningful possibilities in the world. Post-screen technologies enhance the functional aspect of bodily intentionality by integrating it into responsive technological frameworks. Simultaneously, this reconfiguration prompts essential inquiries regarding bodily attunement and habituation. As perceptual habits adjust to hybrid environments, the body integrates technological structures into its functional repertoire. These incorporations may become pre-reflective, influencing perceptions of space, distance, and accessibility without reaching focal awareness. A phenomenological analysis is necessary to address both explicit interactions and the implicit ways in which post-screen technologies influence bodily comportment. This section posits that post-screen mediation does not merely augment an unaltered body with new tools through the examination of these transformations. Instead, it plays a role in reorganizing the lived body as the perceptual center of a mixed field. The body is increasingly characterized by its ability to navigate technologically influenced environments, consequently transforming the conditions of perception, agency, and corporeal presence. This reconfiguration lays the groundwork for a more comprehensive examination of the transformation of perceptual intentionality in post-screen contexts.

5. Operative Intentionality and Hybrid Perceptual Fields

Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of flesh (*la chair*) provides a robust framework for examining technologically mediated presence in post-screen contexts. Flesh signifies the fundamental medium wherein body

and world are interwoven, rendering perception not as a relationship between a separate subject and an external object, but as a chiasmic entanglement of perceiver and perceived. This ontology undermines fixed separations between interior and exterior, subject and object, and offers conceptual tools for comprehending the role of technological mediation in the formation of perceptual presence. Merleau-Ponty (2002) writes that “hardness and softness ... present themselves ... as certain kinds of symbioses” (p. 370). In post-screen contexts, technologically mediated environments can be perceived as integral components of this corporeal domain rather than as superficial additions to an otherwise cohesive perceptual reality. Augmented and ambient technologies integrate with bodily perception by becoming components of the perceptual field through which reality is revealed. Digital overlays, spatialized sound, and haptic feedback do not merely signify information; they are integrated into the perceptual fabric of the environment. This integration indicates that technological mediation is progressively functioning at the level of perceptual ontology rather than solely at the level of representation.

The idea of intercorporeality helps us understand how presence changes in environments without screens. For Merleau-Ponty, intersubjective experience is based on the physical recognition of others as expressive, perceiving bodies. In technologically hybrid environments, intercorporeality is facilitated through avatars, spatial audio, motion capture, and algorithmically organized interaction. These mediations change how people see and understand bodily presence and expressive gesture, which changes the conditions under which people meet others as embodied subjects. This change doesn't mean that embodiment is simply lost; instead, it means that bodily co-presence is redefined. Post-screen mediation can facilitate novel modalities of intercorporeal attunement while simultaneously introducing fresh instances of opacity, delay, and abstraction. Phenomenologically, this prompts inquiries regarding the maintenance or disruption of expressive movement, affective resonance, and bodily synchronization within technologically mediated contexts.

By positioning technologically mediated presence within the ontology of flesh, this paper propounds the assertion that post-screen technologies do not merely facilitate interactions among pre-existing subjects. Instead, they are involved in the ongoing creation of a shared world of perception. Presence is not merely conveyed through technology; it is co-constituted through the interconnection of bodies, environments, and technological frameworks. This viewpoint rejects technological determinism and oversimplified accounts of disembodiment, instead highlighting the intricate interrelations between embodiment and mediation. This ontological and intersubjective examination reinforces the necessity for a unique phenomenology of post-screen perception—one that can elucidate how technologically mediated environments transform not only individual perception but also the collective frameworks of embodied presence.

7. Toward a Phenomenology of Post-Screen Perception

This section develops a phenomenology of post-screen perception as a unique form of perceptual organization, building on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and prior analyses. The main point is that post-screen technologies change how we see things not only at the level of the interface, but also at the level of the perceptual field, bodily intentionality, and environmental constitution. This framework goes beyond models that focus on screens by seeing perception as distributed, environmental, and dynamically embodied. Post-screen perception is defined by three fundamental characteristics.

First, perception becomes rooted in the environment instead of being focused on the interface. Digital mediation is no longer primarily perceived as a distinct object of focus; instead, it functions as a structuring element within the surrounding perceptual field. This environmental embedding changes the focus of meaning from surfaces that represent things to spatial relationships and how the body moves through space.

Second, perception becomes sensorimotor-distributed. Post-screen perception does not primarily revolve around vision; instead, it incorporates gesture, posture, proprioception, and haptic feedback as fundamental components of perceptual meaning. This redistribution corresponds with Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the primacy of embodied engagement and contests visualist paradigms of digital experience.

Third, perception becomes functionally hybrid. Technological responsiveness shapes operative intentionality in such a way that bodily action and environmental feedback form tightly linked loops. Meaning arises from this dynamic coupling instead of from detached observation or symbolic interpretation. The perceptual field is jointly formed by corporeal abilities and technological frameworks.

This phenomenology of post-screen perception offers a counterpoint to technological determinism and solely cognitive interpretations of digital experience. This framework does not view technology as an external force that either enhances or diminishes human perception. Instead, it focuses on how embodied engagement with hybrid environments reorganizes perception. In doing so, it brings to light the connection between classical phenomenological ideas and modern technological situations. By identifying and framing post-screen perception as a unique phenomenological configuration, this section introduces an innovative theoretical lexicon to discussions in phenomenology, media philosophy, and human–technology relations. It elucidates the role of emerging technologies in transforming not only the content of perception but also the fundamental structure of perception itself. This framework also serves as a foundation for the critical assessment of forthcoming technological advancements regarding their impact on embodied meaning, perceptual orientation, and collective experiential realms.

8. Critical Discussion: Beyond Technological Determinism

Modern conversations about new technologies often go back and forth between being techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic. They either see post-screen developments as ways to improve human abilities or as dangers to attention, embodiment, and real experience. Both perspectives often depend on technologically deterministic assumptions, viewing technology as an independent entity that singularly influences human perception. These methods may fail to recognize the intricate, reciprocal interactions among bodily intentionality, perceptual habits, and technological contexts. Merleau-Ponty (2002) argues that “the function [of objective thinking] is to reduce all phenomena which bear witness to the union of subject and world ...” (p. 373). A phenomenological perspective contests these deterministic frameworks by asserting that perception is not merely influenced by technology but is actively formed through embodied engagement. Post-screen technologies do not merely impose novel perceptual frameworks; they are integrated into lived experience through bodily habituation, practical proficiency, and environmental attunement. This incorporation process emphasizes the function of the lived body as an active mediator rather than a passive recipient of technological influence.

Additionally, purely instrumental or cognitive explanations of post-screen interaction often diminish perception to mere information processing, task execution, or attentional efficacy. Although these metrics are useful in practical situations, they do not reflect the qualitative change in perceptual meaning. A Merleau-Pontian perspective emphasizes the transformative role of technologies in altering the pre-reflective conditions that render the world meaningful, thus engaging with aspects of experience that evade quantitative assessment. This critical perspective further complicates narratives of disembodiment. People often say that post-screen environments make bodily presence more virtual or abstract. The analysis presented in this paper indicates that embodiment is not eradicated but rather restructured. Technologies contribute to the reconfiguration of bodily orientation, spatial interaction, and intercorporeal relationships, resulting in novel manifestations of embodied presence rather than a mere diminution of embodiment. Phenomenology offers a conceptual framework for examining these transformations without diminishing them to mere degradation or enhancement. This paper situates post-screen perception within embodied, relational, and environmental frameworks, thereby opposing both reductive technological determinism and exclusively human-centered voluntarism. Instead, it puts forward a relational view in which perception comes from the dynamic interaction of bodies, technologies, and environments. This viewpoint facilitates a more sophisticated philosophical assessment of post-screen advancements, considering both their transformative capabilities and their experiential implications.

9. Conclusion

This paper contends that the advent of post-screen technologies signifies a profound alteration in the framework of human perception. These technologies do more than just add new interfaces; they change the way we see things by moving mediation from framed visual displays to hybrid physical–digital environments. Utilizing a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological framework, the study demonstrates that this transformation entails a reconfiguration of the lived body, operative intentionality, spatiality, and intercorporeal presence. By expanding upon Merleau-Ponty's notions of embodiment, flesh, and perceptual intentionality, this paper has formulated a novel framework for comprehending post-screen perception as environmentally embedded, sensorimotor-distributed, and operationally hybrid. This framework transcends screen-centric and representational models of mediation, providing a phenomenological lexicon that can articulate the experiential dynamics of nascent technological contexts. The primary contribution of the paper is the conceptualization of post-screen perception not as a technological imposition on human subjects, but as a relational transformation of embodied subject–world relations. It opposes both technological determinism and simplistic cognitive models, instead focusing on how perception is formed by the interaction of bodies, environments, and technological structures. Philosophically, this investigation enriches contemporary phenomenology by illustrating the enduring significance of Merleau-Ponty's theories in the analysis of technologically mediated environments. It provides conceptual tools for media philosophy, digital studies, and human–technology research across disciplines. In a broader sense, it suggests that perception in a world without screens will not disappear or be replaced, but will change into new ways of experiencing meaning, space, and shared experiences. Subsequent research may enhance this framework via empirical phenomenological investigations of post-screen environments and comparative analyses with alternative philosophical traditions, thereby elucidating the ways in which emerging technologies transform the fundamental conditions of human perception. Finally, this analysis highlights the ethical and existential implications of post-screen perception, as alterations in perceptual structure also redefine norms of attention, agency, and collective reality. As perceptual environments evolve into more hybrid and immersive realms, inquiries regarding responsibility, orientation, and intersubjective recognition become increasingly pressing. A phenomenological analysis of post-screen technologies elucidates the reorganization of perception and reveals the implicit reconfiguration of interpersonal relationships and modes of existence within the world. It is crucial to consider these dimensions for philosophical reflection to remain attuned to the tangible impacts of evolving technological environments.

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